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1
Ab stract
Recognition of previously seen persons and recall of the
circumstances of their encounter were tested in a situation'
where subjects were unaware of the subsequent recognition
task.

Subjects encountered four: persons, one of each sex.

in. two separate encounters.

Prior to a lineup one week

later, only 51 subjects (N = 145) failed to' recall either
the number and/or the sex of the persons encountered, while
only 28. correctly recalled both the number and sex and that ■
.
it was two different persons in each encounter.

Results

from the lineup confirmed, previous suggestions that subjects
(N = 155) are better able to recognize persons than recall
where they encountered them.

The best recognition perfor

mance came from male subjects' recognition of female criminals,
a finding that contradicts previous research.

The best

recall performance came from female subjects' recall of
where they encountered, male criminals.

Prompted by

considerable variation in the indictment rates and the
recognizability of the individual suspects, the issues of
representative sampling of stimuli and generalization are
discussed as potential problems in facial recognition
studies.

Consideration was also given to the manner in

which recall of the circumstances of encounter is typically
calculated.
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Memory for Persons, Encounters and Sex
It would seem that visual recognition memory of a
previously seen face and the ability to. recall’ accurately
the circumstances of the previous encounter arc both
necessary for correct indictment of a criminal suspect.
Refent research, however,, suggests that subjects' abilities
in these two memorial operations differ substantially.
Whether these results may be generalized to identification
of criminal suspects in real life is another question.
Extant literature show's recognition of pictures .of scenes
and faces to be quite good, at least when tested under,
favorable conditions..

However, when it has been tested,

recall of the circumstances of encounter either has not
been clearly separated from recognition or has been tested
in design's that make, it difficult to draw unequivocal
generalizations to criminal indictment situations.
Shepard (1967) studied recognition,.using self-paced
presentations in a directed memory task (i.e., with subjects
having knowledge of the subsequent recognition task).

He

had his subjects view 612 pictures of assorted scenes and
objects which were chosen to be high in memorability and
low in similarity.

Subjects were then immediately tested

for recognition with 68 "old-new" (previously seen-not"
previously seen) pairs.

The task turned out to be quite

Memory for Persons
3'
easy.

Median correct recognition 'of the old member of' the

pair was. 98 .5^*

It remained above 90% -even for subjects

tested after, a one week delay.

Standing (1973) made the .

recognition task more difficult by. limiting viewing time
to 5 sec per item with an interstimulus Interval of about
one-half sec.

Under these less favorable conditions, he

presented his subjects with 10 ,000 ’pictures over a fourday -period, testing- with 160 old-new pairs.

Recognition

accuracy was about .90%.
It is difficult to -compare .studies using pictures of
scenes with those using pictures .of faces, because of
differences in procedure in- addition to differences in
materials-.

Eve.n so, recognition of faces generally seems

to be rather respectable, If.somewhat below that for scenes..
Thus Hochberg and Galper (1967)3 using Shepard's procedure,1
presented subjects with 60 pictures of female college
student faces^ testing immediate recognition with 15 old-,
new pairs.

Median, accuracy.was 90%.

Yin.(1969) limited

viewing time to 3 sec per face and presented-his subjects
with as many as 64 slides of adult male faces.

Immediate,

recognition accuracy on 24 old-new pairs was about 96%.
.While the above studies generally Involved subjects
instructed to regard picture, recognition as their main '
task, Bower, and Karlin (1974).manipulated task' instructions,
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finding strong differences in resulting accuracyj

While

half their subjects were .attempting to memorize the faces-,
the other twelve thought they were in a reR.cf ion-rti me:
experiment.

The subjects studied 72 photographs of white

college .student faces (36 of each sex) for 5 sec each,
making, for each-, one of .three binary'j udgments ; either sex,
likableneSs or honesty.

Those subjects tested without

knowledge of the- subsequent recongition task (incidental
memory) ranged in accuracy from 60$ for faces whose sex had
been identified to 8l$ for faces for whom honesty had. been
judged.

Subjects in the directed memory task produced

accuracy .rates ranging' from 56$ for faces identified by sex
to. 80$ for faces judged to be more likable than average.
However

knowledge affects judgments of likableness and

honesty., these results suggest that it is not the intention
to learn but the depth at which the input is processed that
produces good recognition memory.

That is, the depth at

which the stimulus input is analyzed directly determines the
probability of recognition.

Judgments as to whether a face

is more likable or honest than average- require the input
to be analyzed at a depth, greater than that required for
judgments of sex.
Though Bower and Karlin (1974) used sex of face as a
variable in their study, they did not investigate memory
for faces as a function-' of sex of subject.

Though studies
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doing so are not numerous and have many variations in
procedure', there does seem to be a fairly consistent
underlying pattern of results.

Cross, Cross, and Daly (1971)

had subjects study a matrix of faces, two faces from each of:
1.2 age—sex-race categories, in an ■incidental

learning task.

Effort was made to simulate the real world experience of
seeing many faces before encountering the need to recognize
a previously seen face.by giving the subjects an intervening
task of judging 96 faces on their relative beauty.

The

subjects were then shown a second matrix containing 12
faces from the first matrix plus 12 new faces 'matched on
the subject variables.

Results showed that although overall

recognition accuracy was only about 40$, the female subjects
performed more accurately than the male subjects, a n d .female
faces were more often recognized.

Closer inspection revealed

that women recognized female faces (43/0 more often than men
(37%), but male faces (33$) less often than men (36$).

The

male subjects, on the other hand, recognized faces of both
sexes with about, equal facility.
While the.small sample- of faces of each type limits
generalizations concerning facial variables, Cross et a l .
have received varied support for their recognition results.
Several years■earlier, Howells

(1938) observed that women

may be superior to men at face recognition.

His subjects
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studied a card containing three different .pictures of thes.ame face for 10 sec, then immediately' attempted to find
another card- of three different pictures of the same face
among a display-of such cards.

Though he showed, faces of

each sex and tested samples from several populations, (e.g.,
college students, sales people and farmers), he apparently
did not analyze for differences in recognition of each
type of face..

Across all faces, women -tended.to be' more

accurate than men.

The finding reported by Cross et al.

.(1971) that is of particular interest, however, is the nature'
of the, sex of subject by sex of photo interaction.

Witryol

and Kaess (19 57) while reporting an overall female
superiority also report a tendency for males to remember
pictures of ..males' better than pictures of females, and
.'similarly for females to remember better pictures of their
own sex.

Ellis, Shepherd, and Bruce (1973) found that the

overall superiority of the girls (12 and 17 years) was mainly
due to their significantly better, scores on recognizing
pictures of females; the girls did not, however,.do signi
ficantly better than the boys at recognizing faces of males.
This latter finding of no sex difference in recognizing 'male.
faces has been recently reported' also by Going and- Read (197^)•
*
They showed their subjects 56 slides of college student faces
(28 of each sex)..

The faces in the slides, which, had

previously been rated by other subjects for their uniqueness •
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on a 7-point scale of. uniqueness, were chosen from the
extreme groups of the uniqueness, scale.

That is, half

had been rated high on the uniqueness scale while the other
28 (.14 of each sex) had been rated as not'being very unique faces.

Results showed that, regardless of the level of

uniqueness of the stimumus face, women were overall more
accurate in. the"recognition task and that female faces Were
the most often recognized.

While the women" recognizee

female faces more often than male faces, they did not
perform better on the’male faces than did the men.

Similarly,

Shroder. (Note 1), whose subjects studied 80. slides of faces
that differed 'on race (Black; White) and sex (male; female),
found her women subjects (her only Black subjects were
Malawian males) to make the fewest recognition errors across
all,categories of faces.

While these women did better on

faces of their own race and sex, the White males did at
least as. well as the women.on White male, faces.

This the.

pattern emerges that subjects recognize faces of their own sex
better than those of the. opposite sex with women performing
better overall.
.Thus,.under a .variety' o.f experimental manipulations,
recognition memory for previously seen pictures of faces
appears to be quite robust.

Recall of the circumstances of

encounter, on the other hand,- has. not been shown to be .
comparable.

Standing, Conezio,.and Haber (1970). point this
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out in one of their experiments.

They first showed- subjects,

■pictures of -scenes ■differing in orientation, and then., after
varying -retention intervals, .showed old-new- pairs of
pictures with instructions both to identify the old-pairmember as well as its previous orientation.

While their

subjects did reasonably well if tested soon after
presentation, the. ability to recall accurately the circum
stances of encounter (previous orientation) declined;
markedly with longer' delays.
showed no comparable decline.

Recognition accuracy, however,
Comparable results have been ■
'

recently•demonstasted using pictures of faces.

'In a directed'

memory task, Brown,. D.eff enbacher, and Sturgill (in press,
Experiment 1) had their subjects study 25 pictures of
children's faces for 20 sec each in a. particular

room, then,

two hours, later, 25 more such pictures in a very dissimilar
room.

Two days later the subjects returned, to a third room

with instructions a) to select from the. (old-new.) pair the
picture that was previously seen, and b) to place that
picture in- the pile corresponding to the room in which it
was first encountered..Recognition accuracy was high, as one
would expect , about

9 '6 % T h o u g h at 58% and with

ranged from 0.'44 to

0.68, recall of the circumstances of

scores that

encounter (the room of encounter) was above chance— in the
statistical sense, it was hardly... impressive.

Only five of

Memory for Persons
9
the 14 subjects were able, to recall the circumstances of
encounter in a statistically reliable fashion.

In order

to obtain.an unbiased .expression of subjectsT performance
and to facilitate interexperimental comparison, signal .
detection analyses were performed, yielding d's of 2.48
and 0.40 for recognition and recall, respectively.
Thus In a standard laboratory task, only 36% of the
subjects in Brown, Deffenbacher, and Sturgill (in press,
Experiment 1) were able to recall the circumstances of
encounter ah above a chance rate.

Similar‘performances

would hardly be satisfactory were they to hold true in
real-life identifications of criminal, suspects.

Perhaps

witness performances in real-life is like' that of these
subjects, able to recognize having seen a face but with
little memory of where that face was encountered.

Brown

et a l . conducted two additional studies which simulate
more closely than laboratory tasks actual encounters
witnesses might be expected to have with criminals.

Since

the present study stems from some important questions raised
by these two.studies, they will be dealt with in some detail.
In Experiment 2 (Brown et al., in press) subjects were
first presented with two -groups of five "criminals" (paid
vulunteers, all male) for- 25 sec each in a directed memory
task.

About an hour, later, 15 front-side view mugs.hots

were presented with instructions to identify the criminals—
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if any— who earlier had appeared at the front of the class.
The mugshots were of five criminals,'five, suspects who would
later be seen in a lineup and five fillers.

In this more

realistic situation where subjects were attempting to..'
identify persons, previously Seen live from mugshots, their
performance was much less accurate (dT = O'. 71) than in
Experiment 1 where the recognition was of the same picture
presented twice.
The results of greatest forensic- interest are those
obtained one .week later at the lineup phase of the exper
iment.

As a result of the ways in which the suspects, were

arranged in the various- phases of the experiment, each of'
the four lineups staged consisted of suspects from the
following four, conditions:

Suspects who had been seen by

the subjects both as criminals and in the mugshots

(CMS);

suspects who had been seen as criminals but who had not
been seen in the. mugshots

(CNMS); suspects who had been

seen in the mugshots only (MS); and Suspects who were being
seen for the first time, in the lineup only (LO),. - Results
showed that indictment rates for the CMS, CNMS, MS and LO
groups were 0 .653 0.51* 0.20, and 0.08, respectively
(ps < 0 .0003)i with a mean indictment rate across all
groups of 0 .3 6 .

Comparisons of each criminal group .with

the- noncriminal.ones resulted in larger d 's than the one
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obtained in the mugshot phase, indicating that criminals
were easier to recognize when they reappeared live than,
when they reappeared in mug.shots'.
The indictment rates at the lineup clearly show that
a suspect was more likely to be indicted if' he were a
criminal* particularly if his mugshot also had been seen*
than if he were an innocent.

While this may seem to

indicate an ability to recall the circumstances of encounter,
note that an' MS'suspect stood a not terribly -remote cue-in
five probability of being indicted and a CNMS suspect has
as much as a o.ne-in-two probability of. escaping, indictment. ■
The main' indication of an ability to recall the .circumstances
of encounter was evidenced by a doubling of the MS indict
ment rate in response to a second question asked, at the
lineup* namely* whether or n o t .the suspect's mugshot had
been .seen (while this question was asked in both studies
2 and 3> .the results were not reported because of space
limitations).

To this question the indictment rates for

the CMS 3 CNMS* MS and LO groups .were 0 .59 *' O'. 47 * 0.40 and
0.19 respectively *:with a.mean rate of 0.41.

Unfortunately*

the increase, in the MS indictment rate was accompanied by
an increase in the LO' arid.a decrease.in the CMS indictment
rates.

The strongest evidence against an ability to recall

the circumstances■of encounter was that.regardless of
question asked* suspects were indicted in the same order of
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decreasing magnitude.

Suspects who had been seen both as

a criminal and in the mugshots, were indicted•most, often;
.suspects.seen, live but not in the mugshots were indicted
next most often; third most frequently indicted were
suspects.previously seen only in the mugshots; and indicted
least often were innocents making their first appearance..
Indictments.,’then, seem to have been made primarily on
recognition, where increases occured as.a function of
number of previous exposures, particularly live exposures.
Whereas Experiment 2 (Brown et a l ., in press) simulated
a situation where wi-tnes.ses were, aware that a crime was
occurring and attempted to memorize, the criminals’ faces,
Experiment 3 simulated instead a 1situation in which witnesses
were unaware that a crime was taking place and had, therefore,
no obvious motivation to memorize the criminals’ faces.

In

addition, there were only four criminals, two of whom were
encountered only'by half of the subjects and the other pair
of criminals were encountered' only, by the other half of ’the
subjects.'. Two or. three days, later mugshots of 10 fillers,
and two criminals were.' shown.

Half the subjects saw

mugshots of one 'criminal: from each pair and the other two
criminals w e r e .seen by the other half of the ■subjects.
Thus of the two criminals encountered by any subject at the ■
■scene of the crime., only one appeared in' the mugshots.

One
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week from the original encounter a lineup was staged
consisting of the four criminals (all male.) , each of whom
had been seen by approximately one-quarter; of the subjects
in one of the four encounter conditions--CMS, 'CNMS', MS and
LO.

In general the indictment■rates were mu-ch lower in

this nondirected memory experiment than in the previous
directed one.

The mean correct indictment, rate of criminals

in the mugshot phase was 0.28 while the mean false indict
ment rate of innocents was 0.15 (dT = 0.46, p_ < 0 .0001,
from chance, i.e., a d ! of zero.).
Indictment rates at the lineup for the CMS’, CNMS, MS
and LO conditions were 0.45, 0.2:4, 0.29 and 0.18 respectively,
with a mean of 0.29*

In contrast to Experiment 2, a criminal

was more likely to be indicted than an' innocent only if his
mugshot had. also been seen.

Even then he (CMS)' was indicted

only 2.5 times a s .often, as someone not previously encountered'
at all.

A suspect' who had been seen .only at the scene of

the crime' (CNMS) was as likely to be indicted as a suspect
in either of the noncriminal conditions.

Results (unpublished)

from the question regarding whose mugshot.had been shown
revealed that the mugshots considerably influenced the
subjects' memories.

Indictment rates, for the CMS, CNMS,

MS and LO conditions were 0.89, O.63, 0.88 and 0 .50
respectively.

Again, an inability to recall- accurately the
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the circumstances,of encounter is indicated.

Regardless,

of whether the person present or mugshot present question
was asked,' indictments followed the. same order of
decreasing' magnitude; CMS suspects were, indicted most, MS
next most,'CNMS next most and LO the least.

A3 in Exper

iment 2, it was. a shift in the MS" indictment rate, that gave
evidence of an ability to recall the circumstances of encounter.
In this experiment, however, the. shift was greater, probably
due- to the strong influence of the mugshots.

The Indi-cation

of a recall ability was best seen when the CMS condition was
compared to the MS in the signal detection analyses.

The

d f between the two' conditions .involving mugshots when the
question was changed is as would b e ’expected-.-if the circum
stances of encounter were' being recalled -properly .

However

that may be, it.still appeared that indictments were made
primarily on the basis of recognition with increases being'
a function of.number of'previous exposures, particularly,
in this case, mugshot exposures.
Thus, while in both experiments (Brown., -Def'fenbacher &
Sturgill, in p?ress, Experiments 2 and 3) indictments'
appeared to be based primarily on recognition with little
memory for the circumstances, of encounter.

Which encounter

(live or mugshots) most influenced recognition changed as
a function 'of the type of crime being simulated, whether it
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was a crime the witnesses knew was occurring or whether ’
instead it was one i n which the witnesses, were ignorant
of its occurrence.

,A possible interpretation of this

change i n ,influence from live (Experiment 2). to mugshot
(Experiment f) encounters might lie in the depth of
processing hypothesis (Bower & Karlin, 1974), with live
.

/

encounters being the more deeply processed, in situations
where the witnesses knew a crime .was occurring, and mugshots.
when the witnesses did not have this knowledge.

However,

depth of processing may effect recognition, its effect on
recall of the circumstances of encounter in Experiments 2
and 3 is difficult to determine.

Indeed, recall'in the two

experiments must.be. inferred .indirectly from shifts In
response rates resulting.from ■changes in questions asked,
from inquiries regarding live encounters to ones regarding
mugshot encounters.
'The present study sought.to separate these two equally
important— at least in the present context-memorial
operations, I .e.. , recognition o f .faces previously seen and
recall .of the. circumstances of their encounter.

Additionally,

it sought to test- the generalizability of previous studies
by using live stimulus persons of both sexes.

Recognition of

faces was tested in much the same manner as In Brown et al.,.
Experiment 3•

The subjects’ task was to. select .persons they
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had previously encountered from a lineup.
recall task' was- one based on previous

The principle'

(Brown et. al. 5

Experiment 1; Standing, Conezio, & Haber, 1970) methods of
testing and measuring recall of the circumstances of
encounter.

;The subjects were' asked to indicate in- which of

two circumstances they had encountered the suspects they
recognized.

Two additional recall tasks were also incor

porated into the experiment.

One:, given prior to the

lineup, tested subjects’ memory.for the number and sex of the
persons they had encountered at. the scene of the crime.

The

other asked the specific activity of each of the tw.o criminals.
Thus the present experiment sought to investigate, not only
recognition of faces but .recall of their-encounter as a.
function of sex of subject and sex of stimulus person.

\

Method
Subjects were members, of a large introductory psychology
class.

Though 237 cias;s members made the initial encounter,

only the' responses from 155 (44 males and 111 females) class
members were usable as 6l class members did not return for
the lineup phase and 21 of those who did had incomplete
protocols or otherwise failed to follow instructions, or
claimed to know one or more of the criminals,

One-hundred-

fifty class members responded to the .first questionnaire
(concerning the number and sex of the persons encountered)

Memory for Persons
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of’which four protocols were incomplete and one was '
unscorable, leaving a total of 14s (107 female and 3-8. male)
subjects/

Initially the class members were unaware, of their'

participation in a research project.

However,:prior to

the collection of recognition and- recall data, t h e .class
members were informed of what had occurred and were given
the option to decline further participation.
Eight" people ■agreed to act as '’criminals” : five graduate
students, (three women and two men), two male upper class
undergraduates and a former student (female) presently
employed outside, .the university system.

Insofar as possible,

these' persons, were selected so as to warrant their inclusion
in the same lineup, at .least within each sex, and so-as 'to
minimize' the likelihood of previous contacts vith th.e class
members.

Brown, Deffenbacher, and Sturgill (Experiments 2

and 3 ) successfully met these selection' criteria, as evidenced
by reasonably, stable Indictment rates within a condition,
even within a fairly wide range of variables such as, e.g.,
hair color , skin p'Igment ation, build,' etc .
As the class members' entered the. examination room to
take their second midterm, they were given their test materials
by the criminals.

The examination room had two entrance

corridors, and two criminals .(one m a n .and one woman) we're
stationed in each corridor; one handed out test questions ’and
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the other IBM.answer sheets.

'

'Owing to. the narrowness of

the entrance corridors (-1.14m), the criminals were encountered
in succession*

Thus,.sex of criminal and type of test

material (test questions or answer, sheets) first encountered
by each subject, were counterbalanced across entrance
corridors.

Class members entering .a given corridor could

not see 'the ■criminals in the other corridor;.

Attempting to

get roughly half the -class members .encountering each set of
criminals, the course instructor had given instructions to .'
the class members to enter and .exit a given corridor, based.
.on their, surnames.

The -.IBM answer' sheets were unobtrusively

coded so that it could be determined which pair-of criminals actually and been encountered by each class member.
A second criminal-witness encounter occurred after the
class members had completed their examination and were leaving
the room.

During the examination, a second set of criminals

(again, one man and one woman) unobtrusively replaced the
first pair in each'corridor.

The exact location of the

seocnd pair of criminals .within' each corridor.was slightly
different from that of the firpt. pair of criminals.

Also,

the second pair was positioned behind a table whereas the
first pair .'was not.

These changes produced slight perceptual

differences in the two encounters:, such as backdrop, angle of
regard and the table-..

The class members/witnesses left their
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completed tests -with this second set of criminals who
coded the IBM answer sheets with'respect to the corridor
at which they were- located.

Thus' it was possible to

determine for each, subject the set'of criminals encountered
both on the way into and out of the examination room.
One. week later at the next scheduled, meeting, of .the
whole class, the class members were 'asked to respond to
two questionnaires.

The first, given prior to the lineup,

asked the class members to indicate how many people they
had encountered on their way into the classroom the preceding
week, handing out' test materials, and how many people they
encountered on the. way out, collecting test materials.

In

addition to asking the class members to' recall .the number
of criminals in each encounter, they were also asked to
indicate'- the sex of each criminal, whether •it was the same
people across both encounters, and, if not, to indicate' the
nature of the change.
A second-questionnaire w a s .distributed to the class
members after the first one was collected, then a lineup was
staged..

The lineup consisted of all eight persons acting as

criminals.

.However,- for any one class member only four were

actually criminals; the other four were distractors.

Thus

a person in the lineup was responded to both as a criminal
and an innocent:

Each suspect was his/her own control.

The

arrangement of the suspects within' the lineup was balanced
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on sex of suspect, encounter (in or out) and corridor
(east or west).

Each suspect in the lineup wore a large

identification letter OA-H) around his/her neck and different
clothing from.that worn at the scene of the crime.

The

second questionnaire asked more' specific questions about
the people the class members encountered.

The class members

were told that they had encountered four'people the
preceding, week, two, handing out test materials and two
collecting them, and that these four people were present’ in
the lineup.

Their task, should they ohoose to accept it,

was to select from these- eight people the. four ,they had
encountered previously and the four they had not seen.
Then from the four selected as having been seen, they were'to
determine which pair handed them their test materials as
they entered the room and which pair-collected' the
tests as they were leaving.

Finally, from the two selected

as the ones encountered on 'the way into the.room, which one
was handing out test questions and which one the IBM answer
sheets.

On the way out, there was no distinction made as .to

which criminal collected test questions' and which collected
'IBM answer sheets.■ Regardless of question asked, in this

second questionnaire for each response the class members
were asked to indicate their confidence in that response'by
marking one of the following three, choices.:
I am moderately sure; I . am not sure.

I am. quite sure;
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Results
Responses to the first questionnaire were grouped into
three main categories

(N = 14 5)•

Only- 28 Subjects

were completely accurate (category 1 ).

( 1 9 %).

An. additional 66

subjects (46 %) were correct as to the number and sex of
persons encountered but reported that they were the same
two people in each .encounter (category 2) . ■. The remaining
51 subjects (35%) incorrectly reported the number, the
sex, or both (category 3).

The proportion of subjects

responding in each.of these categories was. independent of
sex of subjects. (X^ (2 ) = .0.10 7 ns ) .
The 51 subjects in category 3 were tabulated further
according to the nature of their errors.

Thirteen subjects

•reported the correct number of persons for each encounter,
but were incorrect as to sex.

Of these, only one reported

that all persons encountered were of the same sex.

This

was the only- subject- responding (out of 145) who failed to
report that the persons encountered were a mixed sex group.
Among the 38 subjects reporting the wrong number of persons
encountered, 29 reported too many, 24 claiming that there
were five, and the others that there had been six-. , The
eight subjects reporting too few persons claimed that three
had been encountered.

Across, category 3, 33 subjects

reported, that,there were more men than.women, 15 that there
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were more women than men, and only 3 that the numbers of
each sex were equal..
Two measures of recognition accuracy. were obtained■from the questionnaire given in conjunction with the
lineup; the-proportion of correct indictments (hit's) and.
the proportion of incorrect, indictments (false alarms)-.
The hit rate, summed' across all 155 subjects, was-. 0.,54,'
while the false indictment' rate was .O'.M.

These indictment

rates correspond to an overall d ' for recognition of 0 .30,
which by Marascuilo 's (-1.970) one-signal significance test,
(derived from Gourevitch & Gal ant.er., 1967) is significantly
.(p < 0.0001) greater than -a dl. of zero (chance discrimination')*
The rather small probability ..of such a small d T being
.attributable to random responding'.results from the large
number of' subjects encountering four criminals'.'

The ■

proportion of correct indictments, were then grouped by
encounter to determine whether subjects recognized better
the persons they encountered 'when entering the room or when
exiting the room.

Results showed.that across all. subjects

the indictment rate of the criminal pair handing out test
materials (0.55) did not'differ.significantly from that of
the criminal pair collecting test, materials (0-56), using
z-tests for correlated proportions (z = 0.40, ns).

Similarly,,

when separated by sex of subject, there was no significant
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(zs = 0.63 and 0 .66, for males and females,: respectively,
ps > 0 .05) tendency- differentially to indict the criminals
of pne encounter.
Responses■were, pooled-within sex of suspect as a
function of.sex of subject and d 1s were calculated.. As
can be seen in Table 1, male subjects' recognition (d' = 0.46)
of criminals was ..considerably better than recognition by
females (dT = "0.20).

In terms of a corresponding main effect

for sex of criminal, recognition of female faces (dT = O.38)

Insert Table 1. about here

was better than recognition of male faces (dT = 0.20).

It.

can further be seen that the direction of both main effects
can be' accounted for .by the m a l e .subjects' accuracy when
indicting female, criminals ,(dT .=.-0.69) •

Male subjects'

recognition of female, criminals was significantly better
than female subjects' recognition of' male criminals, using'
Gourevitch and Galanter's

(1967) test for significance between

two d's (G = 2..25, P < 0.05)> and was marginally significant
(0.05 <:'P < O'. 10) both over recognition of males by males
(dT = 0.22) and recognition of females, by females

(dT - 0.28).

Though female subjects recognized faces' of their own sex
better, 'this difference was not significant.
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Responses were pooled across all subjects, and hit
and false alarm rates and d ’s were calculated for each
suspect in the lineup. 'As can be,seen from.Table 2, there
was considerable variation in .the indictments and d's of
the suspects regardless of sex of subject.

The mean of the

Insert Table 2 about here

proportion correct indictments as a function of suspects
(Sum) was 0.54 with a SD of 0.18 and a range of 0.48.

The

variation among the false indictments was about the same:
The mean of the proportion incorrect indictments as a
function of suspects (Sum) was 0.46 with a SD o f 0.14
and a range of O'.45-

The mean of the d's by suspect' was

0.30 while the SD was 0.47 and the range 1.55*
Three dependent t-tes.ts were performed to determine
whether subjects’ confidence in their responses differed
when making correct or incorrect responses, when responding
to males' or females and when responding to criminals or
innocents.

While all three .t-tests;failed to reach

significance (ps > 0.20), the correlation of -confidence
within all three pairings was significant■(ps < Q.OOi).
The correlation of confidence in responses between the
1

4

sexes was 0.. 72, between criminals and innocents 0.68 and
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between correct and incorrect respons.es 0.67*

On the

other hand, there was. no. relationship between accuracy
(correct indictments plus correct rejections) and mean
confidence .summed across, all suspects, (r - 0 .04 , nsj .
To obtain a measure of recall accuracy, only re3pon3e3
to correctly indicted criminals were considered, following
Brown et a l . (in' press) and Standing, Conezio, and Haber
(1970).

In order to use -detection theory analysis, which

Loekhard and Murdock (1970) consider feasible, in a cued
recall situation, the correct recognitions were converted
into hits and false alarms for recall by taking a hit to
be the correct association of criminal -with encounter, and
•a false alarm to be t h e ■incorrect.association of criminal
with encounter.

The hit rate,, pooled across all subjects

and criminals, was. 0.54 and the false indictment rate was
0.46, corresponding to a recall d.' of O’.20 (p < 0.05).
Further analysis showed this ability to recall the circum
stances of encounter not to'b e 'dependent upon the encounter.
A z-test■for correlated proportions indicated no differential
tendency for suspects In one encounter to be recalled more
than suspects in the other, whether handing out or collecting
test materials.

Thus ,on the average, the difference

between correctly, .and incorrectly associating criminal with
encounter was greater than would be expected if subjects were
simply guessing..
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Recall responses were pooled within sex of suspect as
a function, of sex of subject and. d ’s were .calculated.
Table -3)*

(See

Female subjects remembered where they encountered

criminals (dT = 0.30) better than did male subjects (d ' = 0 .05)
though this ■difference was not significant '(G = 1.20, p > 0.25')
On the other hand, encounters, with male criminals (dT = 0.^0)

Insert Table 3 about here

were better recalled'than encounters with female criminals
(dT = 0.05)•'

This difference is marginally significant

(G = 1.82, p < 0.07) hy Gourevitch and Galanter’s (19 67)
test.

The d ’s comprising the cells'of Table 3 were calculated

by considering only the hits, and false alarms on suspects
with sex in common, i.e., hits on male criminals were placed
against false alarms on male innocents and similarly for
females.

The accuracy o f the female subjects' (dT = 0.56)

at correctly associating the male criminals with their .
respective encounters accounts.for the direction of both
main effects.

The females recalled where they encountered

male criminals significantly better than they recalled where
they encountered female criminals (G = I.9 9a P_ < 0.05) and
significantly better than males recalled where female
criminals were encountered •(G = 2.10, p < 0.-05') .

All other

meaningful comparisons of recall d ’s were not significant.
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Finally, recall responses were pooled across all subjects,
and the proportion of correct recall was determined for
each suspect in the lineup .
can be found in Table 4.

The results of.this.analysis

While the variance of each

distribution differs, the mean proportion of correctlyindicted suspects who were also associated with the right

X

encounter Was 0.52 regardless of whether summing within' or
across sex of subject.

The SD_ for the male subjects.was

Insert Table 4 about here

0.14 -and the range 0.42; for the female subjects the SD
was 0.13 and the range 0.37; and summed across sex of
subject the SD. was 0.10: and the range 0.29*

As with

recognition, the accuracy with which the circumstances of
encounter were recalled was independent'of the subjects1
confidence in their responses 1(r = 0.09, ns ) .
Subjects accuracy, at recalling the activities .of each
criminal handing: out test,materials, whether he/she was
the person distributing test questions or answer sheets,
seemed to :be improved i f .the criminal's r circumstance of
encounter had been correctly recalled'.

When subject perfor

mance was determined only from, criminals who were correctly
recognized as having been encountered, the probability was
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■0.34 that the criminals’ activities at the encounter would
be correctly recalled.

On the other hand,, when subject

performance.was determined from criminals, who already had.
■been correctly recalled as having "indeed been among those
distributing test materials , the probability was 0 .-6.7 that

1

the test material.the criminal distributed would be correctly
recalled.

These recall accuracies'were dependent neither

upon the particular activity of the criminal, i.e., whether,
the criminal was a test question or an answer sheet
distributor (z_.= i.0 7 3 ns) , nor. upon the subject’s expressed
confidence in their responses

(r = 0.08, n s )

Discussion
Res-ults of the present experiment support suggestions
from previous research that recognition, of a previously
seen face is more accurate than recall of the circumstances
of encounter.

As compared with recognition accuracy rates

from experiments using pictures of faces, the correct
indictment rate

the present experiment is lowered in part

for procedural reasons, namely, using a nondirected,memory
design as opposed to.ones which assure the stimulus face is
at least seen, together with any effects of greater retention
interval.

The recognition performance of these subjects was

much like those subjects of Bower and Karlin’s (197^) who
identified faces by their sex, obtaining accuracy•rates, of'
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56% and 6o%> for. directed and incidental tasks,' respectively.
With only one out of 145 subject.S'not■reporting encounters
with .both sexes , subjects in the' present..experiment clearly
made a note of the criminal’s sex.

Though procedures differed

widely, perhap.s Bower and Karlin’s subjects... (.who .'identified
faces ac cording 'to.'the s e x 'of the face) and the subjects in
this experiment processed faces at. a- similar depth.

This

depth enabled them to identify previously encountered faces
at greater than a chance rate but not with the accuracy of
subjects directed to attend to the faces.
The recognition performance of the subjects in the
present experiment also generally support the recognition
results reported by Brown et al., (Experiment 3) •

Simulating

■t'he same nondirected memory situation, both studies obtained
overall recognition d ’s of 0.30.

However, with all-the

variations between the two studies, it is debatable how much'
to make of such agreement.

Where Brown et a l . used four

suspects, all male, the present experiment had eight suspects,
four of each sex.

In addition, there' were obvious differences

in suspect presentation.

The Brown et al. suspects .appeared

once In each of four conditions (as a criminal whose mugshot
was shown two days later t o •some subjects and three days
later to some others; as a criminal without a mugshot and
thus only seen once prlur tu the lineup; a's an innocent seen
only 'in mugshot form either four days for some subjects or
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five days for others before the lineup; and as an
innocent being seen for’ the first time), while the present
experiment.had only two conditions, criminals and innocents.
Thus whether the effects: of the. different conditions and
suspect' presentations between the- two experiments simply
averaged out or whether recognition performance of subjects
in nondirected'memory is reliably described by something
like a .d’ of 0.30 Is difficult to determine.

In both

cases it is ■fairly' clear that subjects, typically gain little
memory strength, .from...encountering .strangers- distributing or
collecting test materials, and for whom there Is otherwise,
except perhaps for the persons’ sex, little motivation to
remember the persons 1 face.

In both cases, there was no

relationship between accuracy and confidence of. their
judgment.
Recognition performance as a function of sex of subject
/

was. not in total.agreement with previous experiments.

Again,

however,- there -is considerable difference in stimulus
materials.

The literature, with its pictures of faces,

generally finds recognition best where the sox of the
subject and. of the face in the picture are the same, with
women doing; the better job across all. sub j ects .. Indeed,
Brown et al.

(Exepriment 3) support this pattern somewhat

by finding their female subjects to have been the most
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accurate.

But Brown et- al. only used male criminals.

Adding female criminals, to the design seems to have affected
male subjects:’ recognition performance to.be different than
reviews of the literature would lead one to expect..

Perhaps .

the male subjects paid more attention to the female criminals,
than they did to the male -criminals.and. more than the female
subjects paid to criminals of either sex.

Extra attention

may have worked through other processes, such as eye
fixations

(Loftus , 1972) , to facilitate the recognition

performance of the male subjects.
finally, a caveat is in. order regarding the interpre
tation' of recognition results, not so much perhaps in the
present experiment..as in many reported .in the literature:
While it appears to be customary to generalize from the
sample of stimulus persons to the population from which they
were selected, this may not always be appropriate.

Although

these problems of generalization were treated extensively by
Brunswik (1956) and are discussed in standard, texts oij research
design (e.g. Plutchik, 197^).3 they seem often ignored or
swept under the rug in facial recognition studies-.

The

selection, of stimuli in facial recognition experiments may
be standardized to studies randomly selecting pictures of
faces from college year books and studies matching live
persons on demographic characteristics.

While.the latter

type of studies usually contain persons representative of an
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important criminal class (white males in their twenties),
it may be hazardous to; generalize results -.obtained from
studies using pictures to situations where live persons are
being remembered.
number of stimuli :

Second, there is the problem of the
Can results from experiments using a.

small number of stimulus faces or persons properly
generalize to the -larger group?

This is not only a problem

for Cross et a l . (1971) and most ;other experiments using
pictures of faces/"but for the present experiment and Brown
et a l . (Experiment 3.) as well., With the latter two studies',
however, arises the problem of feasibility, of using a large
number of live persons as stimuli.
to have. a. large number, of faces ,

It may be difficult
Even if it' can be done,

it may not be feasible to. get large numbers of persons to
show up at a particular place at a specific time.

(The

question of feasibility of number should not apply to studies
using pictures of faces.)

Then, of course, in addition to

the number of suspects, there are the other important
questions in determining generalizability, such as control''
for indietability of the suspects, i.e., their tendency to
collect indictments whether guilty or not (note, for
instance, the high indictability pf suspect -F) , variation
in the re.cognizability (the d Ts) of the individual suspects,
and the representativeness of the sample.

Within the
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present experiment, the generalizability of the findings
would seem to be a function of the number.of suspects in a
given cell: "The d fs on all- eight suspects probably would
be more stable than where recognition is of one sex versus
the other.'
The balanced presentation of the suspects to the
subj ects in both the present experiment and -in Brown et
a l . (Experiment 3) helps reduce somewhat, the problems of
external, reliability and over generalization.

In. these

two studies,; each stimulus person was responded to both as
a criminal and as an innocent, each suspect .serving as
his/her own control.

This procedure permits one to partial

out any bias toward reporting a particular face as having
been seen before.
Cross, et al.

In contrast, the procedure followed by

(1971) and most other studies- of facial

recognition do not permit comparison of hit and false alarm
rates on the same face.

Unless a forced-choice procedure

is used, it is necessary"to get a false alarm rate as well
as a hit rate to determine any response bias as in any
standard psychophysical experiment.

However, for present

purposes, It:is not always necessary to get them, on the
same face...

Rather,' as in Brown et a l . (Experiment 2),

they can be obtained using other faces matched on demographic
characteristics.

However, since there Is apt to be more

variation in resulting recognition' scores.,- this does not lead
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to as good as representative sampling with small 'numbers,
of suspects as with each.suspect, being his/her own control,
, While, 'the recognition results were in general agrees .
ment with previous research using live persons, the results
regarding recall'of the circumstances of encounter can only
i

be compared with studies using pictures .

Where recall ,"

of- the circumstances of encounter has been as directly
assessed, it was done regarding either the previous orien
tation of pictures of scenes (Standing, Conezio, & Haber,
1970) or in which room a picture of a child was previously
seen (Brown et .al., Experiment 1).

Although there are

these differences.in procedure, the results from these
studies and the present, experiment are in general agreement.
Standing et al.

(1970) for example, found that after a 24-

hour retention interval, recall for the circumstances of
encounter was around 70$.

Brown et a l . (Experiment' 1)'

report that their subjects recalled the room of encounter
of the pictures correctly at a mean proportion .of O.58.
Though somewhat lower than Standing’s et a l . subjects’
performance, Brown’s e:t a l . subjects were recalling after
a retention interval of two days.

The present study found

recall of the circumstances of encounter to- be. a mean
proportion' of 0.54 after-a retention interval of one week.
Indeed, results.of the present study and of Brown et al.
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suggest ■witness.performance in a criminal identification
task seems to. b.e determined largely by recognition perfor
mance w i t h ,little recall of t h e 'circumstances of encounter.
The present experiment also obtained information
regarding subjects1 recall of the sex and number of.the
persons they previously encountered.

Though Subject

performance at recalling their encounters with criminals
was low, they were.very accurate in recalling the number
of persons encountered and, except for one subject,
errorless in recalling having encountered a.mixed sex
group.

The tendency' to report seeing more men' than women

may be explained by the fact that all of t h e ■teaching
assistants for this- particular psychology course are male,
and it is likely t o .be teaching assistants dealing with
test materials.

Thus, male would he a reasonable best guess..

While recalling the. number and sex of .the pers-ons.encountered
turned out to be an easy recall task, correct performance
appears not to be facilitative to the other recall tasks
tested, especially when recalling whether it was the same
-two people at. each encounter, apparently a very difficult
recall task.

On the other hand, where subjects did recall

the right circumstance of encounter for those criminals
they correctly indicted, the chances were about two-inthree the criminal’s activities would be- recalled■also.
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Thus, recall of the circumstances of encounter may
facilitate or at least be correlated with, recall, of the
criminal’s activities at the time of encounter.
While the results of the present experiment confirmed
suspicions"of'a'performance difference between recognition,
and .recall in memory for faces, the results do not allow
determination of the magnitude of this difference.

The'

reason for this resides in the manner recall; of the circum
stances of encounter is typically assessed, i.e., on only
correct ‘recognition (cf., Brown et-. al.,' Experiment 1;
Standing et al., 1970 )..

In order to get a ratio measure

of the difference between recognition and recall, a
common baseline is required ..against which both recognition
and recall may be compared.'

While analysis with signal

detection theory provided a bias free index of the relative
■strengths' of recognition‘and recall, it is believed that
the noise, distribution (i.e., the baseline) could not be
the same for recall as it was for recognition.

Bas'ing the

analysis of recall.of the .circumstances, of encounter'on
only correct recognitions may ignore .enough of certain kinds
of information to change' the noise distributions between
the two, making.comparisons indended to- estimate the ratio
of t h e ‘difference impossible.

With respect to.their

separate noise distributions, the two.d’s (i.e., 0.30 and

Memory for Persons

37
0.20, for recognition and recall performance, respectively)
show both recognition of previously seen faces and recall
of ■the -circums tances of their encounter to be quite weak
in nondirected memory.'

Thus, subject performance in these

tasks, is being tested at the' lower limits of memory.
While comparison of the recognition and recall d ’s
simply says that the average strength of discrlminability
of. criminals from Innocents is to, some degree stronger
than the average strength of the association of correctly
indicted criminals with the right circumstances of encoun
ter, some indication of performance differences may be seen
w hen.comparing indictment rates in both recognition and ,
recall.

A criminal.stood.a little less than a one-in-two

probability of escaping indictment and an innocent stood
about the same probability of being indicted.

While

subjects only recognized about' half the criminals they
encountered, they recalled where they encountered only
about half the criminals they, recognized.

Since both the

correct and incorrect indictment rates in both recognition'
and recall .are about the same, similar looking d Ts would
be exp&cted.'

Note, then that recall information is lost

on about half the criminals the subjects encountered and,
hence, lost in the calculation, of the recall d's as well.

Memory for Pers'ons
38 ■
'
Measuring recall■of the circumstances of encounter
on only* the correct recognitions, however, is not
unreasonable where real-life situations are- concerned.
With.respect to forensic inquiries, it may indeed be the
mo.st suitable method of estimating, recall performance':
Courtrooms are notoriously def.endent centered, never
asking witnesses about persons they thought they didn’t
see. '
Finally, regarding.the' interpretation of the results
of recall of the circumstances■of encounter.as a function
of sex of subject:

They were symmetrically' opposite those

.on recognition of previously seen faces -as a function of
sex.

'It might be concluded, that male subjects’- superior

recognition of female criminals’resulted from a greater
depth of processing (Bower & Karlin, 1974) of female
criminals by male' subjects.

It is- debatable .whether the

depth, of processing hypothesis helps to explain recall
performance as a function .of "sex of subject.

As in

r e c o g n i t i o n i t may be t h a t .recall' of the circumstances of
encounter is more apt. to be accurate in cases involving
deeper processing.

Results of the present experiment do

not rule out.that possibility, even'though the poorest
recall performance came from men recalling where they
encountered female criminals.

Besides the depth at which
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critical' identifying features are processed, memory,
performance, may be' determined to some extent by the total
amount of information processed at the.original encounter
that' is present.at testing., Female subjects may have
focused their.attention to include aspects of the' environ
ment , fashions and other attributes of the persons they
encountered that were more' apt to be either absent or
changed at the- lineup,' as well as (facial.) features
predictive of later recognition'.

insofar as things changed

about the .criminals from encounter to lineup,' they were
perhaps greatest for the- female criminals’.

(The female

criminals , expressing concern about how. to dress .'on both
occasions, seemed to "dress-up" a bit more for the lineup
than for the original .encounter .with the subjects, and a
bit more than the male criminals for either encounter.
.The male criminals seemed to'dress more nearly the-same,
though not exactly, on both occasions.).

For stimuli:

where there was. more change, there would be less infor
mation in which to generate.a n 'accurate association of
criminal,with encounter'.

Such being the base, the finding '

that women recognized the female criminals better, as the
literature suggests they should, but recalled better the
encounters with males' does not contradict a depth of
processing hypothesis.
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Reference Note
1. Shro'der, E.. E. . Recognition and attractiveness as a
function .of sex and race. ' Unpublished' masters thesis,
University of Nebraska at.'Omaha, February, ’1975 *
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Footnotes :
■^Introductions to signal .detection theory may be
found in Kimble and Garmezy (196.
8 ) or Galanter (1966).
For more detailed; accounts see chapters in Carterette
and Friedman (1974) or articles in Swets (1964) and for.
applications to memory experiments- see, Banks (1970) and
Lockhart and Murdock (1970)..
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Table 1
d T Scores for. Recognition
Re Sex of Subject by Sex of Criminal

Criminal
Subjects

Male

Female

..22

.69 **

Female

-.18

.28 *

Sum

1. 2.0 *

Male

■*p < 0 0 5
**p < 0 01
****p < 0 0001

.38 **

Sum
.46 **

.20
. 30 ****
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Table 2■
Proportion Correct ■(Hits) and Incorrect (FAs) Indictments
_____________

and d Ts' for Recognition '

____

Female .
IW

.41

•77

>77

.09

.64 ■

.41.

.74 ■ 1..11*

.38

•97*

•72

.44

.28

;6i

.72

•51

.43

.29

.72

:•54

.56*

.03

•0 2

-.30

.'48

.25

•72

.48

-33

.65

•73

.■52

•34

•50

.39

•24 .

.69

..49'

•36.

-.26

•58*

.'■23.■

•26

-.12

..64

BT
tr'
■IW

C0W ’■

e oe

%E'

A0E-

d ie

Hits

•55'

•77

.18

•73

•55

FAs

.5°

.59

•32

.45 * .27

d’

.13

.51' -. 44

.74

Hits

.46

.62

.28

FAs

•54

.49

•35

- .20

•33

- .20

'Hits .48 ■

.66

FAs

•52'

d1

-.10'

Subjects

.

F

Q
o'

Male

■

Male

Female

d’

.

Sum

.o

Subscripts 'of the suspects identification letters

(A-H)

indicate each suspect’s circumstance of encounter, whether
encountered on the way in or out of the room .(I or 0) and.
whether at the east or wes t corridor (E 'or W) .
^p < 0 . 0 5
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Table 3
d 1 Scores f o r ■Recall
Re

Sex of. Sub j ect by Sex of Criminal
■Criminal
Male

.Female

Sum

Male

•15

-.05-.

.05

Female1

..56#**.

.10

•30

Sum

.40**

.05

.20

Subj ect

*p < 0 ..05
< 0 ..01
< 0,

0
0

a
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.Table 4 ,
■'Proportion Correct -Recalls

Male

.

Female

H

A

D

B

C

E

•33.

•53

•15

.62

.42

.44

Female ; 364 ..

. 64

.45

•57

.47

.27

' .45

.63

Sum

.61

.53 '

.59

.45

.35

.44

.64

Subjects
Male '

.56

,

F
.41 .

G
• 65
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Instructions

I am here to ask you. l'u participate in an experiment, and,
then to conduct it with those of you who are willing to
help me out.'

I am attempting to find out how well people'

do at remembering'incidental or chance encounters with
other people.-

To the best of m'y knowledge there has not

been much of anything published on incidental,memory for
faces,, but there, has' been quite a bit of work done with
directed', memory.;. that is , the subjects are 'told they will
be asked to remember the material sometime later.

If in

'these directed memory studies the material to be learned
is- photographs o f 'faces or even live faces, I- know from
■the literature and some'w ork•that I have done myself that
people, do quite well a t .picking■out the faces or people
they were.asked to remember.

What I d o n 't know is, how

good we humans are at remembering faces or people that we
were not asked to remember in situations where we have no
particular motivation to-pay attention to them-.

Situations

like this occur with some' crimes, like getting your pocket
picked, for example. .The.pickpocket .may bump into- you and
take your wallet 'but you are not aware that this has
occurred until' sometime later, .and thus have no particular
motiv tion t.o notice the culprit at the time.

-To'take
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another example, you may encounter several.persons committing
a crime but be completely unaware that a .crime is occurring,
and pay very little attention to them.

Sometime later you

might be asked t o ■identify .these persons.

While I doubt'

that people would do very well at correctly identifying any
one of the culprits when later asked to do so— I d o n ’t.know,
I may be wrong about that— I would suspect, however, the
witness could tell whomever was asking, how many criminals
there were land their sex; but I may be wrong about, that 5 too.
I d o n ’t know.

It is questions like these that I would like

those of you who are interested in this problem to help me
answer.

As you may have surmi.sed from those sheets of paper my
helpers have been passing around to you, you had a chance
encounter with a persons or persons last Monday.

Now,

today, for those'of you who are willing to help me with my
thesis, I would like you to answer some questions about the
person or persons who either handed you.your test materials
as you came in or collected them as you were leaving.

If

you choose not to participate, simply leave your response
sheets blank.

Now, for those who are willing,to help me

out, let’s go over the response sheet very carefully.....

